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Deriving meaning from others’
emotions: attribution, appraisal, and
the use of emotions as social
information
Evert A. van Doorn*, Gerben A. van Kleef* and Joop van der Pligt
Department of Social Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
Emotional expressions constitute a rich source of information. Integrating theorizing
on attribution, appraisal processes, and the use of emotions as social information, we
examined how emotional expressions influence attributions of agency and responsibility
under conditions of ambiguity. Three vignette studies involving different scenarios
indicate that participants used information about others’ emotional expressions to make
sense of ambiguous social situations. Expressions of regret fueled inferences that the
expresser was responsible for an adverse situation, whereas expressions of anger
fueled inferences that someone else was responsible. Also, expressions of anger were
interpreted as a sign of injustice, and expressions of disappointment increased prosocial
intentions (i.e., to help the expresser). The results show that emotional expressions
can help people understand ambiguous social situations by informing attributions that
correspond with each emotion’s associated appraisal structures. The findings advance
understanding of the ways in which emotional expressions help individuals understand
and coordinate social life.
Keywords: emotion, emotional expression, attribution, social appraisal, emotions as social information,
sense-making
Introduction
At times we may ﬁnd ourselves thoroughly disliking a situation in which we don’t know what is
happening. Unfortunately, social situations are often ambiguous; it may be unclear what others
have done, or what they will do next. Such ambiguity can make people uncertain, a state they
are motivated to reduce through sense-making (Kagan, 1972; Wong and Weiner, 1981; Heine
et al., 2006; Rutjens et al., 2012). These sense-making processes, in turn, are closely related to the
experience of emotions. As Frijda (1988, p. 349) put it, “emotions arise in response to the meaning
structures of given situations; diﬀerent emotions arise in response to diﬀerent meaning structures.”
Our own emotions can help us make sense of situations. For example, appraisal
theory states that our emotions are accompanied by inferences about the situation, or
environment, we are in (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Frijda, 1986, 1988; Scherer, 2001;
Scherer and Ellsworth, 2003; Clore and Ortony, 2008). Moreover, the emotional expressions1
1The ‘emotional expression’ is often used to denote facial expressions of emotion. In this paper, we use the term to refer to the
expression of emotion through words. Whether or not the eﬀects observed in this paper also occur when facial expressions
are being used is a question that is beyond the scope of this paper. We return to this issue in the General Discussion.
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of other people can impact our sense-making processes, by
providing information to those people observing their expression
(Keltner and Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010;
Hareli and Hess, 2012).
Imagine a teacher in elementary school who walks into the
schoolyard to ﬁnd a boy crying angrily, or a jury which hears the
tale of a defendant who looks away guiltily. Regardless of what
the teacher or the jury members infer, it seems plausible that they
will also use the emotion expressed by the boy or the defendant
to inform their judgments of responsibility—that is, to ascribe
agency. In the current research, we approach the theoretical
relationship between emotional expressions and sense-making.
We do so by examining whether emotional expressions can
help people resolve ambiguity regarding the causes of events by
providing information about agency – that is, who are responsible
for a certain state of aﬀairs.
Ascribing Meaning to Social Events:
Attribution and Appraisal
One common way in which people give meaning to their
social environment is by analyzing the causes of events. The
role that others’ emotional expressions play in this process
has been researched in two research traditions: attribution
theory and theory on emotion as information. Attribution
theory (Weiner, 1985, 2014) holds that people make sense
of situations on three dimensions: whether an event is
controllable or uncontrollable, internally caused (i.e., by him or
herself) or externally caused (i.e., by others or by situational
factors), and stable or unstable over time (Weiner, 1985).
People attribute causes to own and others’ emotions using a
laypersons’ theory (Hareli, 2014), making attribution theory
a type of appraisal theory (Weiner, 2014). Because people
attribute causes to others’ emotions, attribution theory extends
the idea of appraisal to the interpersonal domain (Weiner,
2014).
Recent theorizing on emotion as information has focused
on the process by which people respond to the emotions of
others. Emotions as social information (EASI) theory (Van Kleef,
2009; Van Kleef et al., 2010, 2011) holds that people who
observe an emotional expression may respond to it based on
inferential processes and/or aﬀective reactions. Observers may
make two types of inferences about the emotion of another
person (de Melo et al., 2014). A reverse appraisal involves
inferring which appraisal the person experiencing the emotion
must have made (Hareli and Hess, 2012), a social appraisal
involves inferring aspects of the social situation which then
trigger appraisals and emotions in the observer (Manstead and
Fischer, 2001).
Inferences from Others’ Emotions
Attribution theory and emotion as information theory have
yielded a substantial body of research on inferences regarding
others’ emotional expressions. People may use expressions of
emotion to infer the cooperativeness (Van Doorn et al., 2012)
and level of risk (e.g., Sorce et al., 1985; Parkinson and Simons,
2009; Parkinson et al., 2012) of the situation in which the
expression takes place. Other inferences may include whether
the target of the expression performed suﬃciently well on
a task (Weiner et al., 1979, 1982; Van Doorn et al., 2014).
Finally, observers may infer qualities of the person expressing
the emotion, such as personality (e.g., Knutson, 1996; Hess
et al., 2000; Hareli and Hess, 2010), status (e.g., Tiedens, 2001),
moral beliefs (e.g., Horberg et al., 2013), and the likely next
behavior of an emotional counterpart in a negotiation (e.g., Van
Kleef et al., 2004, 2006; Wubben et al., 2009; de Melo et al.,
2014).
In most of the studies above in which social inferences were
studied (save for Knutson’s, 1996 work on the inference of
stable personality traits), emotion expressions were relatively
contextualized, with clear antecedents such as another person’s
performance on a test (Weiner et al., 1982), or balloon task
(Parkinson et al., 2012), or a bid in a round of negotiations
(de Melo et al., 2014). While such contextualization helps
draw conclusions regarding the inferences that people make
based on an expressed emotion within a speciﬁc social context,
they say little about social contexts in which an observation
is made without an antecedent for the emotion expression
being clear. If we are to argue that emotion provides observers
with information, it seems important to establish whether its
communicative value can be predicted under ambiguity. The
aim of this paper, therefore, is to examine whether inferences of
agency can reliably be predicted from emotional expressions of
anger, regret and disappointment in relatively ambiguous social
contexts.
Anger and Regret as Cues of Agency
People commonly express anger or regret in response to a
negative event or outcome (Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002).
These emotions diﬀer in the amount of control they imply over
the event or outcome. Anger usually involves the attribution
of a negative outcome to an external agent, often a person
(Averill, 1982; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones, 2004). It involves
the perception that this agent is responsible or blameworthy
(Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002; Berkowitz and Harmon-Jones,
2004; Kuppens and Van Mechelen, 2007; Carver and Harmon-
Jones, 2009). The experience of regret, in contrast, involves an
attribution of self-agency, or internal responsibility, for a negative
outcome (Zeelenberg et al., 2000; Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002)
implying that the person experiencing the emotion is to be
considered responsible or blameworthy. As such, the information
which these emotions convey with regards to agency maps onto
causality, a central dimension of attribution theory (Weiner,
1985, 2014).
In line with earlier, contextualized diﬀerentiations of these
emotions with regards to blameworthiness (e.g., de Melo et al.,
2014), we expect that in situations in which no clear antecedent
for the experience of these emotions is given, a discrepancy
in communicated control should lead to diﬀerent inferences
between these emotions with regards to agency. To test this
hypothesis, we formulated vignettes describing how another
person expressed emotion in an ambiguous situation. We
expected that perceivers would associate expressions of anger
with attributions of agency to a third person and expressions of
regret with attributions of agency to the expressing person.
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Study 1
Method
Participants and Design
Respondents were 70 people from the United States (37 women,
ageM = 35.66, SD= 11.55, range 18–62 years) who participated
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website (Buhrmester et al., 2011).
Participants completed a 10-min survey in exchange for $0.50
USD (a regular rate on the Mechanical Turk website). We asked
participants to read one of two diﬀerent scenarios, in which either
anger (N = 36) or regret (N = 34) was expressed.
Materials and Procedure
Participants logged in via the Amazon website, and were
redirected to a survey. They read that we were interested in
the inferences people make based on minimal information. We
prepared a short scenario description, which read: “Suppose
you meet a good friend, whom you have not seen for a while.
While you are catching up, this friend recalls something that
recently happened. Your friend placed an online order for a
new cell phone. The phone would be delivered to a store,
where your friend could pick it up. As your friend went to
the store, a salesperson was there to handle the order. Your
friend goes on to tell you the whole story. While telling you
what happened, your friend is [getting really angry/feeling
very regretful]. Your friend expresses [anger/regret] several
times.”
After reading this description, participants completed a
questionnaire. First, they indicated attributions with regards to
the cause of the emotion expressed by their friend, by ascribing
agency to their friend (three items; e.g., “Do you think the
emotion of your friend was caused by his or her own behavior?”
α = 0.96), another person (three items; e.g., “Do you think the
emotion of your friend was caused by another person?” α= 0.97),
and the situation (two items; e.g., “Do you think the emotion
of your friend was caused by circumstances beyond anyone’s
control?” r = 0.80, p< 0.001).
Please note that because it would not be possible for
participants to make inferences regarding a speciﬁc antecedent
to the expression of emotion, we asked participants to infer
agency with regards to the cause of the emotion expressed in
the vignettes throughout the studies reported in this paper.
Subsequently, participants indicated the extent to which their
friend had expressed anger and regret (one item each). All
questions were answered on scales ranging from 1 (not at all),
to 7 (very much so).
Results
Throughout this report, corrected degrees of freedom are
reported for t tests whenever there was inequality of variances.
Manipulation Checks
Participants perceived their friend as more angry in the anger
condition (M = 6.36, SD = 1.10) than in the regret condition
(M = 2.82, SD = 1.82), t(53.71) = 9.79, p < 0.001, d = 2.67,
r = 0.80, and as more regretful in the regret condition
(M = 6.35, SD = 1.04) than in the anger condition (M = 3.83,
SD = 1.67), t(59.22) = 7.64, p < 0.001, d = 1.99, r = 0.70. We
therefore conclude that the emotional expression manipulation
was successful.
Attributions of Agency2
Items for each group of dependent measures were averaged
to form scales. We performed t-tests between the anger and
regret conditions to compare participants’ attributions about
the cause of the emotion. As expected, participants attributed
more agency to their friend when he or she expressed regret
(M = 3.76, SD= 1.55) compared to anger (M = 2.61, SD= 1.45),
t(68) = 3.21, p = 0.002, d = 0.78, r = 36. Additionally,
participants made less agency attributions to another person
when their friend expressed regret (M = 4.71, SD = 1.51)
compared to anger, M = 5.82, SD = 1.03, t(57.77) = 3.60,
p = 0.001, d = 0.95, r = 0.43. Participants’ attributions of the
incident to uncontrollable circumstances did not diﬀer between
the anger (M= 4.01, SD= 1.43) and regret conditions (M = 3.97,
SD = 1.39), t(68) = 0.83, p = 0.41. This pattern of results is
visually represented in Figure 1.
Discussion
Findings from Study 1 demonstrate that, as predicted, an
expression of anger by a friend led to greater attribution of agency
for the expressed emotion to other people and less attribution
of agency to the person expressing the emotion, compared to
expressions of regret. These ﬁndings provide initial evidence
that people use others’ emotional expressions as a source of
information when attempting to ascribe meaning to ambiguous
social situations, in a way that is congruent with the framework
of attribution theory.
2In order to examine whether the attributions of agency that participants made
following the various emotions were aﬀected by gender, we re-ran the analyses
reported above, this time including participant gender as an exploratory factor
(there were at least 16 participants in each cell of the 2 × 2 design). No eﬀects
of gender were observed on attributions of agency to the friend, to other people, or
to circumstances, all F values<1.17, all p values>0.28.
FIGURE 1 | Effects of emotional expressions on attributions of agency
to the expresser, a third person, and circumstances (Study 1).
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Study 2
Based on the ﬁndings from Study 1, a clear distinction can be
made between anger and regret in terms of the agency that these
emotions communicate when they are expressed. However, these
diﬀerences are relative, in the sense that they were not compared
to a control condition in which no emotion expression was
mentioned. It is therefore impossible to tell whether the eﬀects
were driven by anger, regret, or both. Study 2 included a control
condition to allow us to compare the eﬀects of anger and regret to
a non-emotional baseline. In addition, we used a scenario with a
more severe outcome in Study 2, to examine whether results from
Study 1 would generalize.
In addition to these methodological changes, we set out
to explore whether the agency eﬀects that we observed in
Study 1 would generalize to conceptually related perceptions of
responsibility. Anger often involves the appraisal that someone
else is to blame for a negative outcome (Kuppens and Van
Mechelen, 2007), whereas regret tends to involve the appraisal
that oneself is to blame (Zeelenberg et al., 2000). Therefore, it
seems plausible that expressions of anger and regret would have
comparable eﬀects on perceptions of responsibility and agency.
We examined this possibility in Study 2. Finally, we included
measures of perceived coping potential and behavioral intentions
toward the expresser for exploratory purposes.
Method
Participants and Design
The experiment was completed by 179 participants from the
United States (97 female; age M= 35.02, SD= 12.73 years, range
18–67 years), who were again recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical
Turk website. As in Study 1, participants completed a 10-min
survey in exchange for $0.50 USD. We asked participants to read
one of three diﬀerent scenarios, which again included the anger
(N = 62) and regret (N = 58) conditions, as well as a control
condition (N = 59) in which no emotion was mentioned.
Materials and Procedure
Participants completed the same procedure as in Study 1, but
with a diﬀerent scenario. The scenario used in Study 2 read:
“Suppose you meet a good friend, whom you have not seen for
a while. While you are catching up, this friend tells you about
a recent incident. Your friend was using the car to get to a
party at another friend’s place. During the ride, your friend was
involved in an accident with another car. Your friend goes on
to tell you the whole story. You can see that, while telling you
what happened, your friend is [getting really angry/feeling very
regretful]. Your friend expresses [anger/regret] several times.” In
the control condition, the last two sentences were omitted.
After reading this description, participants completed a
questionnaire, consisting of the questions that were also used in
Study 1 (emotion caused by friend: α = 0.93; emotion caused
by another person: α = 0.95; emotion caused by uncontrollable
circumstances: r= 0.81, p< 0.001) as well as questions regarding
the extent to which their friend was responsible for the outcome
of the situation (α= 0.92); the extent to which another person was
responsible for the outcome of the situation (α= 0.92); the coping
ability of the friend (α = 0.64); and participants’ intention to
help their friend deal with the situation (α = 0.84). Manipulation
checks were the same as in Study 1.
Results
Means, standard deviations, and speciﬁc contrasts for the
analyses in Study 2 are reported in Table 1.
Manipulation Checks
As expected, analyses of variance (ANOVA) on the manipulation
checks showed that participants perceived their friend as more
angry in the anger condition than in the other emotion
conditions, F(2,176) = 117.41, p < 0.001, r = 0.76. Participants
also perceived their friend as more regretful in the regret
condition than in the other conditions, F(2,176) = 70.54,
p< 0.001, r = 0.67.
Attributions of Agency3
Analyses of variances with planned contrasts comparing the
anger, regret, and no emotion conditions showed that, as in the
previous experiment, participants attributedmore agency to their
friend when their friend expressed regret, compared to when their
friend expressed anger, F(2,176) = 24.74, p < 0.001, r = 0.47.
Attributions of agency in the control condition fell in between
the regret and anger conditions, and diﬀered signiﬁcantly from
both.
As in Study 1, the opposite pattern was observed for
attributions of agency to another person in the situation.
Participants attributed less agency to another person when their
friend expressed regret, compared to when their friend expressed
anger, F(2,176) = 29.93, p < 0.001, r = 0.50. Attributions of
agency in the control condition again fell in between the regret
and anger conditions, and diﬀered signiﬁcantly from both.
Participants’ attributions of cause to uncontrollable
circumstances did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly between conditions,
F(2,176)= 0.97, p= 0.379.
Exploratory Analyses
Diﬀerences in means, as indicated in Table 1, are based on
post hoc tests with Tukey correction. As can be seen in this
table, participants ascribed diﬀerent levels of responsibility to
their friend, F(2,176) = 18.15, p < 0.001, r = 0.35, and the
other person, F(2,176) = 12.27, p < 0.001, r = 0.12, depending
on the emotion that was expressed, and they judged their
friend’s coping potential in light of the expressed emotion,
F(2,176)= 6.64, p= 0.002, r = 0.41. Moreover, participants’ self-
reported intention to help their friend cope with the situation also
diﬀered, F(2,176) = 3,25, p= 0.041, r = 0.19.
As Table 1 shows, participants considered their friend most
responsible when regret was expressed, and less so when either
anger or no emotion were expressed. A similar pattern was found
with regards to estimates of the friend’s coping potential. Also,
participants considered another person to be most responsible
3To examine eﬀects of gender, we re-ran the analyses for all attributions of agency.
All cells in the design included a minimum of 22 participants. No eﬀects of gender
(main or interaction) were observed on attributions of agency to the friend, other
people, or circumstances, all F values<1.34, all p values>0.25.
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 4 July 2015 | Volume 6 | Article 1077
van Doorn et al. Deriving meaning from others’ emotions
TABLE 1 | Mean ratings on dependent measures in study 2.
Anger Regret No emotion Omnibus test
Dependent measure M SD M SD M SD F P
Agency of friend 3.90a 1.60 5.56b 1.03 4.66c 1.15 20.42 <0.001
Agency of others 5.27a 1.45 3.36b 1.26 4.13c 1.36 21.65 <0.001
Agency of circumstances 4.19a 1.68 4.08a 1.29 4.46a 1.55 0.89 0.446
Manipulation check anger 6.63a 0.68 2.83b 1.63 3.93c 1.69 96.24 <0.001
Manipulation check regret 3.32a 1.66 6.36b 0.99 4.61c 1.46 37.99 <0.001
Friend responsible 3.53a 1.40 4.62b 1.11 3.90a 1.14 18.15 <0.001
Other responsible 4.65a 1.35 3.39b 1.02 3.90c 1.06 12.27 <0.001
Friend’s coping potential 3.11a 1.01 3.68b 0.70 3.29a 0.87 6.64 0.002
Intention to help 5.37a† 0.79 5.36a† 0.75 5.01b† 1.04 3.25 0.041
Means with different superscripts (a,b,c) differ at p < 0.05. Different superscripts accompanied by † denote a marginally significant difference (p < 0.10).
when anger was expressed and least when regret was expressed,
with the control condition falling in between. Finally, participants
were marginally more likely to help their friend when he or
she expressed an emotion compared to when no emotion was
expressed.
Discussion
In Study 2, we replicated and extended the pattern of ﬁndings
from Experiment 1. Using a diﬀerent scenario, we found that
when their friend was said to express regret, participants again
attributed more agency to their friend and less to another
person. When their friend was said to express anger, participants
attributed less agency to their friend, andmore to another person.
For both types of attributions, the control condition fell in
between the anger and regret conditions, demonstrating that both
anger and regret uniquely contribute to the communication of
causal properties of the situation. Although including an outcome
reduces the ambiguity of the scenario, it is worth noting that the
results of the outcome for the person expressing the emotion were
not speciﬁed beyond it being a negative event, leaving ambiguity
with regards to the severity of the consequences.
Exploratory analyses further provided evidence that
participants rated their friend as more responsible and
better able to cope with the situation following regret than
following anger or no emotion. Participants assigned more
responsibility to another person in the anger condition, and
less in the regret condition, compared to the control condition.
Finally, results suggested that participants were somewhat more
likely to help their friend deal with the outcome when their
friend had expressed anger or regret as opposed to no emotion,
although this eﬀect did not reach conventional levels of statistical
signiﬁcance. These results indicate that others’ anger and regret
inﬂuenced participants’ ascriptions of agency, related inferences
regarding responsibility and coping potential, and intentions to
help the friend deal with the situation.
Study 3
In Studies 1 and 2, participants reliably attributed more agency
to their friend when (s)he expressed regret, and more agency to
another person when their friend expressed anger. In the ﬁnal
study we aimed to extend our ﬁndings by examining the eﬀects
of expressions of disappointment. In previous research, people
who recalled an experience of disappointment were found to
appraise the cause of the situation to be due to circumstances
beyond their control (Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002). To test
whether disappointment leads to similar attributions of agency
when it is expressed by another person, we included it as a
condition in Study 3. We expected that the disappointment
condition would be similar to the control condition with respect
to the amount of agency participants would attribute to their
friend and another person, but that disappointment would
lead to higher levels of attribution of agency to uncontrollable
circumstances.
We changed the scenario used in Study 2, so that the friend
now described a job interview. An important beneﬁt of using
this new scenario was that the expression of disappointment
would be a more natural ﬁt to this situation than it would
in the scenarios used in the previous studies. As a second
beneﬁt, this scenario allowed us to once again leave the outcome
ambiguous, replicating Study 2 without the outcome being
mentioned explicitly. We also added a measure of perceived
injustice. The perception of unfairness or injustice is a typical
precursor to the experience of anger (Kuppens et al., 2007).
Based on social appraisal accounts (Manstead and Fischer,
2001), a friend’s expression of anger can therefore be expected
to lead participants to perceive greater levels of injustice.
The measure of perceived injustice was added to explore this
possibility.
Method
Participants and Design
We recruited 125 participants from the United States (54
women, age M = 30.06, SD = 9.73, range 18–64 years)
via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk website. Participants again
completed a 10-min survey in exchange for $0.50 USD. We
asked participants to read one of four diﬀerent scenarios,
in which the focal person expressed anger (N = 33),
regret (N = 35), disappointment (N = 31), or no emotion
(N = 26).
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Materials and Procedure
The procedure was identical to that used in Studies 1 and
2, but the scenario was diﬀerent. It read: “Suppose you meet
a good friend, whom you have not spoken to for a while.
While you are catching up, this friend tells you about a recent
job interview. Your friend applied for a position in a large
company. A manager from the personnel department was there
to assess whether your friend would be the person for the
job. Your friend goes on to tell you the whole story. You
can see that, while telling you what happened, your friend
is [getting really angry/feeling really disappointed/feeling very
regretful]. Your friend expresses [anger/disappointment/regret]
several times.” In the control condition, the last two sentences
were omitted.
After reading this description, participants once again
completed a questionnaire. Besides answering the questions that
were also used in Study 2 (emotion caused by friend, α = 0.95;
emotion caused by another person, α = 0.96; emotion caused
by the situation, r = 0.72, p < 0.001; coping ability of friend,
α = 0.83; friend responsible for outcome, α = 0.88; another
person responsible for outcome, α = 0.88; intention to help
friend, α = 0.82), participants were further asked to indicate
how just they considered the application procedure to have been
(four items; e.g., “Do you think the application procedure was
fair?” α = 0.87). Finally, manipulation checks were identical
to those in the previous studies, except for the fact that one
item was added to assess the accuracy of the disappointment
manipulation.
Results
Means, SD, and contrasts for all analyses reported below are
shown in Table 2.
Manipulation Checks
Analyses of variance on the emotion manipulation checks
showed that participants perceived their friend as more angry
in the anger condition than in the other emotion conditions,
F(3,121) = 39.86, p< 0.001, r = 0.71. Participants also perceived
their friend as more regretful in the regret condition than in
the other conditions, F(3,121) = 26.44, p < 0.001, r = 0.63.
Finally, participants perceived their friend as more disappointed
in the disappointment condition than in the other conditions,
F(3,121) = 7.92, p < 0.001, r = 0.41.
Attributions of Agency4
Analyses of variance revealed a signiﬁcant eﬀect of emotion on
attributions of agency to the friend, F(3,121) = 8.73, p < 0.001.
As can be seen in Table 2, attributions of agency to the
friend were higher in the regret condition than in the anger
condition. Levels of agency attribution in the disappointment and
control conditions fell in between those in the regret and anger
conditions, and did not diﬀer from each other.
4To examine eﬀects of gender, we again re-ran the analyses for all causal
attributions. All cells in the design included a minimum of 10 participants. No
eﬀects of gender (main or interaction) were observed on attributions of agency to
the friend, other people, or circumstances, all F values<1.73, all p values>0.16.
As in Study 2, the opposite pattern was observed for
attributions of agency to another person in the situation,
F(3,121) = 12.97, p < 0.001, r = 0.49. Participants attributed
less agency to another person when their friend expressed
regret, compared to when their friend expressed anger. In the
disappointment and control conditions, such attributions again
fell in between the regret and anger conditions, and did not
deviate from one another.
No eﬀects were found on attributions of agency to
uncontrollable circumstances, F(3,121) = 0.73, p = 0.534.
Contrary to our expectation regarding the communicative
function of disappointment, participants’ attribution of agency
to uncontrollable circumstances did not diﬀer between the
disappointment and control conditions.
Exploratory Analyses
Diﬀerences in means, as indicated in Table 2, are based on
post-hoc tests with Tukey correction. Participants ascribed
diﬀerent levels of responsibility to their friend, F(3,121) = 5.08,
p = 0.002, r = 0.33, and to the other person, F(3,121) = 12.22,
p < 0.001, r = 0.48, depending on the emotion expressed,
and they also interpreted the friend’s coping potential in
light of the emotion expressed, F(3,121) = 3.25, p = 0.024,
r = 0.27. Participants’ self-reported intention to help their
friend cope with the situation also diﬀered between conditions,
F(3,121) = 2.83, p = 0.041, r = 0.26. Finally, participants
diﬀered in the extent to which they considered the application
procedure to have been just, F(3,121) = 5.28, p = 0.002,
r = 0.34.
As Table 2 shows, participants judged their friend as less
responsible in the anger condition than in the regret condition,
and they considered their friend’s coping potential to be lower
in the anger condition than in the other conditions. They
also considered someone else’s responsibility to be higher
in the anger condition, compared to the other conditions.
Interestingly, participants indicated greater intentions to help
their friend deal with the situation when their friend expressed
disappointment, compared to when no emotion was expressed.
Finally, participants considered the application procedure to have
been less just in the anger condition compared to the other
conditions.
Discussion
Results from Study 3 replicate the pattern of agency attributions
in the former two studies with a diﬀerent scenario. We also
replicated ﬁndings from Study 2 with regards to the inferred
responsibility of friend and others and the friend’s perceived
coping ability. Moreover, participants considered the application
procedure to have been less just in the anger condition, compared
to the other conditions, providing additional evidence that the
emotions expressed by the friend can (in the absence of other
information) inform participants’ assessment of the situation.
Although a friend who expressed disappointment regarding his
or her outcomes did not lead participants to attribute more
agencies to uncontrollable circumstances, disappointment did
increase intentions to help the friend cope with the situation,
compared to when no emotion was expressed.
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TABLE 2 | Mean ratings on dependent measures in Study 3.
Anger Disappointment Regret No emotion Omnibus test
Dependent Measure M SD M SD M SD M SD F P
Agency of friend 3.84a 1.56 4.31a,b 1.50 5.44c 1.22 4.72b 0.90 8.73 <0.001
Agency of others 5.51a 1.29 4.77b 1.42 3.54c 1.33 4.67b 1.19 12.97 <0.001
Agency of circumstances 3.95a 1.61 3.61a 1.36 3.54a 1.35 3.46a 1.31 0.73 0.53
Manipulation check anger 6.52a .90 3.35b 1.89 3.09b 1.46 3.62b 1.39 39.86 <0.001
Manipulation check disappointment 5.82a 1.31 6.55c 0.93 5.31a,b 1.45 4.81b 1.94 7.92 <0.001
Manipulation check regret 3.91a 1.44 4.97b 1.54 6.54c 0.98 3.85a 1.64 26.44 <0.001
Friend responsible 3.12a 1.39 3.73a,b 1.29 4.27b 1.16 3.71a,b 0.92 5.08 0.002
Other responsible 4.85a 1.10 3.77b,c 1.13 3.20b 1.35 4.11a,c 0.87 12.22 <0.001
Friend’s coping potential 3.85a† 1.37 4.61b† 1.25 4.66a,b 1.32 4.62b† 0.86 3.25 0.024
Intention to help 5.33a,b 0.82 5.63a 0.65 5.53a,b 0.75 5.09b 0.81 2.83 0.041
Procedural justice 3.87a† 1.37 4.76b 0.86 4.78b 0.98 4.56b† 0.93 5.28 0.002
Means with different superscripts (a,b,c,d) differ at p < 0.05. Different superscripts accompanied by † denote a marginally significant difference (p < 0.10).
General Discussion
Integrating theorizing on attribution (Weiner, 1985), social
appraisal (Manstead and Fischer, 2001), and the use of emotion
as social information (Van Kleef, 2009), we conducted three
scenario studies to examine how emotional expressions inﬂuence
attributions of agency and responsibility in ambiguous contexts.
We found that expressions of regret about a particular state of
aﬀairs led perceivers to attribute greater agency and responsibility
for the situation to the expresser, whereas expressions of anger
resulted in greater attributions of agency and responsibility to
a third person. These studies replicate eﬀects found in previous
research in which the expressed emotions had clear contextual
antecedents (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004, 2006; de Melo et al.,
2014). We also found that expressions of anger were interpreted
as a sign of injustice, and that expressions of disappointment
increased tendencies to help the expresser.
These results show that evenwhen there is no clear antecedent
to the expression of emotion by another person, people’s
inferences regarding the agency of the expresser and others
correspond to the appraisal structures associated with the
emotions. These results indicate that inferences that people make
regarding the person expressing the emotion don’t necessarily
rely on a preceding outcome being known, and make an account
of emotions as social information less sensitive to context and,
therefore, stronger. Our results are novel in that under conditions
of ambiguity, inferences of agency are a markedly more dynamic
class of social inferences than inferences of stable personality
traits (Knutson, 1996). Accordingly, one promising avenue for
further research is to determine whether eﬀects of emotional
expressions on inferences about the situation in which the
emotion is expressed, qualities of the expressing person, and
qualities of the person to whom the expression is directed can
be similarly decontextualized.
People may use social appraisal (Manstead and Fischer, 2001),
reverse appraisal (Hareli and Hess, 2012), or a combination
thereof to make inferences based on others’ emotions (de Melo
et al., 2014). When inferences result from one, or both, of
these processes is currently unclear. In the current studies, social
appraisals regarding agency and responsibility could reliably
be made, despite a lack of a contextual antecedent of (cause
of) the emotion expression. Because no antecedent event was
described as a trigger for the emotion that was being expressed,
however, it seems less likely that our participants engaged in
the reconstruction of the appraisals of the person expressing
an emotion (i.e., reverse appraisal; de Melo et al., 2014). The
information needed to do so was simply not available to them.
A promising line for future research could be to investigate
which information observers use in order to reliably reconstruct
the appraisals underlying an expression of emotion which they
observe.
Interestingly, Study 3 revealed no evidence that the
expression of disappointment inﬂuences attributions of
agency and responsibility. It thus seems that the link between
disappointment and situational agency, which was found in
previous research (e.g., Van Dijk and Zeelenberg, 2002), did not
translate to social appraisals, perhaps because the experience
of disappointment often results in inaction (Zeelenberg et al.,
2000). Understanding why someone does not act may be less
important than understanding why someone does act, and may
hence have less of an impact on the social appraisals (Manstead
and Fischer, 2001) that observers themselves are likely to make
of the situation. Interestingly, the expression of disappointment
did increase self-reported intentions to help the expresser.
This ﬁnding is in line with research on prosocial behavior
(Van Doorn et al., 2015) and negotiation (Van Kleef et al.,
2006; Lelieveld et al., 2013), which also yielded evidence that
expressions of disappointment can elicit cooperative behavior.
Whether disappointment reliably yields a social appraisal that
someone should be helped, however, is a question for further
research.
In interpreting the current ﬁndings, a number of potential
limitations of our approach must be considered. First, we
presented participants with hypothetical scenarios, rendering
it unclear at this point to what extent the current ﬁndings
generalize to actual situations. Although similar methodology
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was used previously in research on attribution processes (e.g.,
Weiner, 1985), it will be important to replicate the current
eﬀects in more dynamic, real-world situations (Parkinson
and Manstead, 1993). A second potential limitation of the
present studies concerns the reliance on verbal descriptions
of emotional expressions. Emotions may be expressed in
various ways, including via facial displays, vocal cues, bodily
postures, verbal expressions, and/or symbols such as emoticons.
Despite the obvious qualitative diﬀerences between these
various expressive modalities, there is increasing evidence
that the interpersonal eﬀects of emotional expressions
are functionally equivalent in that the direction (but not
necessarily the magnitude) of their eﬀects on other individuals
is the same across expressive channels (Van Kleef et al.,
2011).
This observation is consistent with a social-functional
approach to emotions (Darwin, 1872; Parkinson, 1996; Keltner
and Haidt, 1999; Van Kleef, 2009; Fischer and Manstead, in
press). For instance, a basic assumption underlying EASI theory
is that individuals turn to each other’s emotional expressions
to make sense of ambiguous (social) situations, and that
such disambiguating information can be gleaned from verbal
as well as non-verbal expressions (Van Kleef et al., 2011).
In line with this “functional equivalence hypothesis,” recent
studies on the role of emotional expressions in persuasion and
conformity showed that eﬀects were similar regardless of whether
emotions were expressed in words, through facial displays, via
emoticons, or via a combination of facial, vocal, and postural
cues (Heerdink et al., 2013; Van Kleef et al., 2015). In light of
this evidence, and earlier work by Knutson (1996) who found
eﬀects of facial expressions of emotion on inferences regarding
the personality of the expressing person, we assume that we
would have found similar eﬀects in the current studies if we
had manipulated emotional expressions using non-verbal cues.
Clearly, however, future research is needed to substantiate this
assumption.
Awaiting further investigations, we conclude that people
use others’ emotional expressions as a source of information
when attempting to make sense of social situations. More
speciﬁcally, individuals use the emotional expressions of others
to arrive at inferences regarding others’ agency and responsibility
for a current state of aﬀairs, which correspond with the
appraisal structures associated with the emotions. These ﬁndings
contribute to a growing body of research that speaks to the ways
in which individuals draw on conceptual emotion knowledge to
interpret the emotional expressions of others. Such inferential
processes play an important role in the construal and navigation
of social life.
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